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Abstract: The classical Friday the 13th Effect refers to a calendar anomaly of financial markets 
which is generated by the fear of bad luck shared by the superstitious investors. As a result of their 
behavior, the returns from the supposed unlucky day of Friday the 13th are significant lower than 
those from the other Fridays. The superstition could also affect the returns from the trading days 
there are adjacent to Friday the 13th. In order to avoid the bad luck, some investors sell their stocks 
a trading day before and their transactions lead to a fall of the prices. Those who are reluctant to 
buy stocks on Friday the 13th delay such transactions to the next trading day causing prices to rise. 
In time, the knowledge about this pattern could induce significant changes in investors’ behavior, 
even to those that are not superstitious. Once become aware that one trading day before Friday the 
13th the stock prices are usually low, many investors would prefer to sell two or three trading days 
before. There also were investors that would buy stocks not one trading day after Friday the 13th, 
when the prices are expected to be high, but two or three trading days after. Other investors could 
exploit the opportunities to buy cheap on Friday the 13th or one trading day before or to sell high 
one trading day after and their transactions could attenuate the abnormal returns from these days. 
In such ways the classical form of Friday the 13th Effect could be replaced by an extended form 
which consists in abnormal returns for a specific time interval that starts some trading days before 
the supposed unlucky day and ends some trading days after. This paper explores the behavior of the 
stock returns of 42 companies, from seven sectors of the United States economy, in the period 
January 2010 – March 2019, for a time interval that starts three trading days before Friday the 13th 
and ends three trading days after. The results indicate, for many of them, significant low returns in 
some trading days before Friday the 13th and/or significant high returns some trading days after. We 
also found some particularities of the extended Friday the 13th Effect among the seven sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A calendar anomaly of a financial market is characterized by an abnormal behavior of the 
assets prices in a specific time interval. Quite often, after a calendar effect became known 
among the investors, their transactions, initiated in order to speculate abnormal returns or to 
avoid risk, induce significant changes in the assets prices behavior (Tan et al., 1998; Dimson 
& Marsh, 1999; Marquering et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2010). Sometimes, such transactions 
lead to an enlargement of the time interval associated to the calendar anomaly. In this way, 
the classical form of this calendar coexists with an extended form, with a larger time 
interval. 
 
In this paper we approach the extended form of Friday the 13th Effect. The classical form of 
this calendar anomaly was revealed by the seminal paper of Kolb & Rodriguez (1987) who 
concluded that, on the United States capital market, the assets returns from Fridays the 13th 
are significant lower than those from the other Fridays. However, their findings weren’t 
confirmed by other studies that investigated the presence of this calendar anomaly for 
different periods of time (see, for example: Dyl & Maberly, 1988; Chamberlain et al., 1991).  
Peltomäki & Peni (2010) proposed an extended form of the Friday the 13th Effect with a 
specific time interval that includes, along with this supposed unlucky day, the adjacent 
trading days. It is presumed that superstitious investors sell the risky assets during the 
trading day before Friday the 13th in order to avoid the bad luck associated. Their 
transactions could cause a decline of the prices in that day. The next trading day after Friday 
the 13th, when the pessimistic expectations disappeared, investors could buy the risky assets 
and their transactions lead to a rise of the prices.  
 
The time interval that starts a trading day before Friday the 13th and ends a trading day after 
could also be enlarged. Once the investors, superstitious or not, became aware about the 
relative low prices that occurred a trading day before the supposed unlucky day, they could 
sell the risky assets two or three trading days before Friday the 13th. The knowledge that 
during the trading day before the prices are relative high could make them to buy the risky 
assets two or three trading days after Friday the 13th (Dumitriu & Stefanescu, 2019). There 
also are investors who see opportunities in the abnormal returns that occur in Friday the 13th 
and in the adjacent trading days. They could exploit the low prices from Friday the 13th and 
in the trading day before by buying cheap. They could also wait for the day after Friday the 
13th to sell high (Stefanescu & Dumitriu, 2018). Such transactions would probably increase 
prices in Friday the 13th and in the trading day before but they could decrease prices in the 
trading day before.    
   
We investigate the extended Friday the 13th Effect presence with a specific time interval that 
starts three trading day before Friday the 13th and ends three trading day after. We study the 
behavior during that time interval of the stock returns of 42 companies from seven sectors of 
the United States economy (Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Defensive, Energy, Financial 
Services, Healthcare, Industrials and Technology). This investigation covers the period 
January 2010 – March 2019. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as it follows: the second part describes the data and 
methodology employed to investigate the presence of the extended Friday the 13th Effect, 
the third part presents the empirical results and the fourth part concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1. Data 
 
In this investigation about the extended form of the Friday the 13th Effect we employ daily 
adjusted closed values of stocks prices of 42 from seven sectors of the United States 
economy (the list of these companies is presented in the Table 1). The sample of data, 
provided by Yahoo! Finance, covers the period January 2010 – March 2019. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
For each company we compute the logarithmic stock returns (ri,t) as:  
 
100)]ln()[ln( 1,,,  tjtjtj PPr                                                         (1) 
 
where Pj,t and Pj,t-1 are the closing values of the stock price of the company j on the days t 
and t-1, respectively. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the returns, reported in the Table 2, indicate that, with two 
exceptions, the average returns were positive. For all 36 companies, Jarque-Bera tests 
indicate that returns are not normal distributed. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We analyzed the stationarity of the stock returns using Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) 
unit root test with two variants:  
- with an intercept and no trend; 
- with an intercept and trend (Dickey & Fuller, 1979; Dickey & Fuller, 1981).   
 
The numbers of lags for these tests were chosen based on the classical Akaike Information 
Criteria (Akaike, 1998). The results of ADF tests, summarized in the Table 3, indicate, for 
all 36 companies, the stock returns stationarity.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
   
2.2. Methodology 
 
In this investigation, the specific time interval of the extended Friday the 13th Effect starts 
three trading days before Friday the 13th and ends three trading days after: 
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We try to capture the behavior of the stock returns during this time interval by employing 
regressions with dummy variables. First, for Friday the 13th, we define the dummy variable 
(DF130,t) as: 
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For the days that precede Fridays the 13th we employ a category of dummy variables (DF13-
k,t) defined as: 
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In case of the days that follow Fridays the 13th we use another category of dummy variables 
(DF13+k,t) defined by the formula: 
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For each company we try to detect the presence of the Fridays the 13th Effect by employing 
the regression: 
 
 t
k
tkktj DFr   

3
3
,0, 13                                                                (5) 
where:  
- μ0 is a constant term;  
- λk is a coefficient specific to the dummy variable DF13-/+k reflecting the influence on the 
returns of kth trading days before/after a Friday the 13th (-3 ≤ k ≤ 3);  
- εt is the error term.  
 
For the residuals of the regression we apply Breusch-Godfrey (1980) Lagrange multiplier 
tests and White (1980) tests. If the results indicate the presence of the serial correlations or 
heteroskedasticity we have to modify the standard errors and the p-values associated to the 
regressions coefficients using Newey-West (1994) corrections.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
The coefficients of extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the Consumer Cyclical 
Sector are reported in the Table 4. For four of the six companies (DIS, HD, LOW and NKE) 
we found significant negative values of the λ-2 coefficient. For the HD returns the λ0 
coefficient has a significant negative value, while the λ1 coefficient has a significant positive 
value. In the case of LOW’s returns we identified a significant positive value of the λ3 
coefficient. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The Table 5 illustrates the coefficients of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for 
the Consumer Defensive Sector. For the BGS returns the λ-3 coefficient has a significant 
negative value. For the other five companies (KO, PG, THS, WBA and WMT) we found 
significant positive values of the λ+1 coefficient. For the WBA returns the value of the λ+3 
coefficient is significant positive. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results of extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the Energy Sector are 
summarized in the Table 6. For three companies (DVN, MRO and SLB) we found no 
significant values of any coefficient. In the case of APA returns, the λ-1 coefficient has a 
significant negative value, while the λ+3 coefficient has a significant positive value. We also 
found significant positive values of the λ+1 coefficient in the case of CVX and XOM. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The Table 7 presents the coefficients of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for 
the Financial Services Sector. We found that λ0 coefficients have significant negative values 
in the case of two companies (AXP and GS). For three companies (AIG, JPM and TRV) the 
λ3 coefficients have significant positive values. In case of TRV stock the λ1 coefficient is 
also significant positive. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the Healthcare Sector are 
summarized in the Table 8. The λ-3 coefficient has significant positive values for two 
companies (ABT and PFE). We found significant negative values of the λ-2 coefficient for 
three companies (LLY, MRK and PFE). In the case of MRK returns the λ-1 coefficient has a 
significant positive value. For UNH returns the λ0 coefficient has a significant negative 
value. We also found a significant positive value of the λ+1 coefficient for the ABT returns. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The Table 9 reports the coefficients of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the 
Industrials Sector. The λ-2 coefficient has significant negative values for five companies 
(BA, CAT, CMI, MMM and UTX). We found significant positive values of the λ+1 
coefficient in case of two companies (MMM and NOC). For all six companies the λ+3 
coefficient has significant positive values. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The coefficients of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the Technology Sector 
are presented in the Table 10. The λ-2 coefficient has significant negative values for two 
companies (AAPL and MSFT). We found significant negative values of the λ0 coefficient 
for three companies (AAPL, CSCO and IBM). In the case of IBM returns the λ+1 coefficient 
has a significant positive value. For two companies (AAPL and ADBE) the λ+2 coefficients 
have significant positive values. In the case of ADBE returns the λ+3 coefficient has a 
significant positive value. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The study of the stock prices of the 42 companies revealed many abnormal returns in the 
time intervals specific to Friday the 13th Effect: 
- three trading days before Friday the 13th the returns of two companies were 
significant higher than the average (the λ-3 coefficient was significant positive), 
while for one company the returns were significant lower than the average (the λ-3 
coefficient was significant negative); 
- two trading days before Friday the 13th the returns of fourteen companies were 
significant lower than the average (the λ-2 coefficient was significant negative); 
- one trading day before Friday the 13th  the returns of one company were significant 
higher than the average (the λ-1 coefficient was significant positive), while for 
another company the returns were significant lower than the average (the λ-1 
coefficient was significant negative); 
- on Friday the 13th the returns of seven companies were significant lower than the 
average (the λ0 coefficient was significant negative); 
- one trading day after Friday the 13th the returns of thirteen companies were 
significant higher than the average (the λ+1 coefficient was significant positive); 
- two trading days after Friday the 13th  the returns of two companies were significant 
higher than the average (the λ+2 coefficient was significant positive); 
- three trading days after Friday the 13th the returns of twelve companies were 
significant higher than the average (the λ+3 coefficient was significant positive). 
 
Such results could be viewed as evidences in favour of the extended Friday the 13th Effect 
presence. Some investors that want to avoid risks associated to Friday the 13th could sell 
their stocks before the presumed unlucky day and their transactions cause the significant 
low returns. The superstition over the bad luck of Friday the 13th and the knowledge about 
the associated calendar anomaly could be responsible for the low returns from this day. 
Finally, after Friday the 13th had passed and the bad luck fear had disappeared, the investors 
bought stocks causing the returns to increase. 
 
The results of investigation suggest there are some particularities among the US economy 
sectors regarding the stock returns behaviour before, during and after Friday the 13th. We 
found that two trading days before Friday the 13th the returns are significant lower than the 
average for most of the companies from Consumer Cyclical, Healthcare and Industrials 
Sectors. In the case of Consumer Defensive Sector, for most of the companies the returns on 
one trading day after Friday the 13th are significant higher than the average. On Friday the 
13th the returns are significant lower than the average for a half of the companies from the 
Technology Sector. From a half of the companies from the Financial Services Sector we 
found that returns on three trading day after Friday the 13th are significant higher than the 
average. In the case of Energy Sector, the abnormal returns in the time interval associated to 
the extended Friday the 13th Effect are, comparing to other sectors, rather seldom. 
 
It is not easy to appreciate how long there will last the abnormal returns found in this 
investigation. The high or low prices usually attract investors and their transactions could 
make disappear the extended Friday the 13th Effect. 
 
This study could be continued with the investigation over the presence of the extended 
Friday the 13th Effect in other stock markets. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. The companies and sectors involved in the investigation   
Symbol Company Name Sector 
DIS The Walt Disney Company 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
HD The Home Depot, Inc. 
LOW Lowe's Companies, Inc. 
MCD McDonald's Corporation 
NKE NIKE, Inc. 
SBUX Starbucks Corporation 
BGS  B&G Foods, Inc.  
Consumer 
Defensive 
KO The Coca-Cola Company 
PG The Procter & Gamble Company 
THS TreeHouse Foods, Inc. 
WBA Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. 
WMT Walmart Inc. 
APA Apache Corporation 
Energy 
 
CVX Chevron Corp. 
DVN Devon Energy 
MRO Marathon Oil Corp. 
SLB Schlumberger Ltd. 
XOM Exxon Mobil Corp. 
AIG American International Group 
Financial Services 
AXP American Express Company 
GS The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
TRV The Travelers Companies, Inc. 
V Visa Inc. 
ABT Abbott Laboratories 
Healthcare 
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 
LLY Lilly (Eli) & Co. 
MRK Merck & Co., Inc. 
PFE Pfizer Inc. 
UNH United Health Group Incorporated 
BA The Boeing Company 
Industrials 
CAT Caterpillar Inc. 
CMI Cummins Inc. 
MMM 3M Company 
NOC Northrop Grumman Corp. 
UTX United Technologies Corporation 
AAPL Apple Inc. 
Technology 
ADBE Adobe Systems Inc 
CSCO Cisco Systems, Inc. 
IBM International Business Machines Corporation 
INTC Intel Corporation 
MSFT Microsoft Corporation 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the stock returns  
Symbol 
Mean Median S.D. Min Max Jarque-Bera 
test 
DIS 0.0586 0.0771 1.31 -9.62 7.35 2700.11*** 
HD 0.0907 0.0784 1.25 -6.07 6.21 655.754*** 
LOW 0.0736 0.0724 1.53 -10.7 9.92 1522.92*** 
MCD 0.0603 0.0824 0.98 -4.89 7.81 2970.76*** 
NKE 0.0829 0.0752 1.50 -9.87 11.5 7370.52*** 
SBUX 0.0897 0.0897 1.51 -10.8 9.47 4240.60*** 
BGS 0.0612 0.0993 1.93 -11.9 20.8 18983.90*** 
KO 0.0369 0.0501 0.94 -8.81 5.53 4054.07*** 
PG 0.0359 0.0314 0.92 -6.06 8.43 3581.83*** 
THS 0.0218 0.0792 1.94 -43.3 11.7 9802.46*** 
WBA 0.0321 0.0481 1.58 -15.5 11.1 8281.11*** 
WMT 0.0359 0.0579 1.10 -10.7 10.3 24046.8*** 
APA -0.0414 0.0123 2.18 -12.2 12.4 633.45*** 
CVX 0.0350 0.0632 1.34 -7.84 6.14 602.34*** 
DVN -0.0313 -0.0153 2.29 -12.5 13.7 1165.87*** 
MRO 0.0050 0.0453 2.50 -12.3 18.9 1924.46*** 
SLB -0.0083 -0.0196 1.72 -9.34 8.44 540.54*** 
XOM 0.0197 0.0123 1.17 -6.39 5.37 795.93*** 
AIG 0.0281 0.0617 1.97 -17.5 15.1 7619.43*** 
AXP 0.0486 0.0768 1.46 -12.9 8.64 4286.72*** 
GS 0.0108 0.0462 1.67 -13.7 9.12 2751.32*** 
JPM 0.0478 0.0351 1.61 -9.89 8.10 1339.15*** 
TRV 0.0534 0.0824 1.13 -7.89 6.21 1843.35*** 
V 0.0927 0.130 1.50 -13.6 14.0 8196.34*** 
ABT 0.0633 0.0658 1.18 -9.75 6.29 3090.09*** 
JNJ 0.0454 0.0326 0.94 -10.6 5.24 8995.90*** 
LLY 0.0701 0.0934 1.25 -11.1 6.34 3244.00*** 
MRK 0.0495 0.0345 1.21 -6.85 9.90 2417.79*** 
PFE 0.0511 0.0290 1.15 -5.44 6.83 672.872*** 
UNH 0.0961 0.102 1.43 -8.30 7.76 726.733*** 
BA 0.0940 0.118 1.55 -9.35 9.42 1158.88*** 
CAT 0.0490 0.0398 1.73 -9.67 7.80 846.636*** 
CMI 0.0620 0.0653 1.85 -9.77 9.93 1248.70*** 
MMM 0.0496 0.0792 1.18 -7.08 5.74 2017.70*** 
NOC 0.0816 0.106 1.26 -6.98 6.00 1027.56*** 
UTX 0.0360 0.0545 1.24 -9.17 5.24 1944.67*** 
AAPL 0.0967 0.0905 1.65 -13.2 8.50 2342.03*** 
ADBE 0.0448 0.0507 1.59 -17.7 14.8 18040.80*** 
CSCO 0.0151 0.0305 1.24 -8.64 8.49 38381.10*** 
IBM 0.0541 0.0627 1.53 -9.54 10.0 4592.13*** 
INTC 0.0680 0.0459 1.45 -12.1 9.94 1500.10*** 
MSFT 0.0360 0.0545 1.24 -9.17 5.24 4188.88*** 
Note: *** means significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 3. ADF tests on the returns 
 
Symbol Test without constant Test with constant 
Number of 
lags 
Test statistic Number of 
lags 
Test statistic 
DIS 4 -23.614*** 4 -23.767*** 
HD 5 -19.721*** 5 -20.093*** 
LOW 3 -24.807*** 3 -24.954*** 
MCD 4 22.425*** 4 -22.718*** 
NKE 3 -26.649*** 3 -26.895*** 
SBUX 2 -30.209*** 2 -30.435*** 
BGS 2 -29.157*** 2 -29.209*** 
KO 4 -22.675*** 4 -22.797*** 
PG 3 -25.671*** 3 -25.774*** 
THS 1 -34.988*** 1 -34.987*** 
WBA 1 -35.511*** 1 -35.526*** 
WMT 2 -28.471*** 2 -28.530*** 
APA 5 -19.028*** 5 -19.049*** 
CVX 5 -20.483*** 5 -20.524*** 
DVN 1 -33.898*** 1 -33.902*** 
MRO 1 -33.749*** 1 -33.742*** 
SLB 5 -22.065*** 5 -22.064*** 
XOM 4 -23.568*** 4 -23.583*** 
AIG 4 -22.844*** 4 -22.855*** 
AXP 4 -22.594*** 5 -21.098*** 
GS 1 -33.667*** 1 -33.661*** 
JPM 2 -28.469*** 2 -28.513*** 
TRV 2 -28.029*** 2 -28.174*** 
V 4 -24.089*** 4 -24.432*** 
ABT 1 -35.285*** 1 -35.433*** 
JNJ 3 -24.693*** 3 -24.846*** 
LLY 2 -28.794*** 2 -28.984*** 
MRK 1 -34.888*** 1 -34.968*** 
PFE 1 -34.613*** 1 -34.706*** 
UNH 3 -25.571*** 3 -25.853*** 
BA 1 -34.203*** 4 -23.378*** 
CAT 4 -22.547*** 4 -22.591*** 
CMI 4 -23.978*** 4 -24.039*** 
MMM 4 -23.409*** 4 -23.538*** 
NOC 1 -32.727*** 1 -32.915*** 
UTX 1 -34.434*** 1 -34.470*** 
AAPL 3 -23.900*** 3 -24.100*** 
ADBE 1 -35.618*** 1 -35.739*** 
CSCO 3 -25.070*** 3 -25.114*** 
IBM 1 -33.992*** 1 -33.993*** 
INTC 1 -34.837*** 1 -34.897*** 
MSFT 4 -23.604*** 4 -23.775*** 
Note: *** means significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 4. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Consumer Cyclical Sector 
Coefficient DIS HD LOW MCD NKE SBUX 
μ0 0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.086*** 
(0.027) 
0.071** 
(0.033) 
0.059*** 
(0.021) 
0.085*** 
(0.032) 
0.085*** 
(0.032) 
λ-3 0.037 
(0.334) 
0.045 
(0.381) 
0.237 
(0.603) 
0.045 
(0.232) 
−0.112 
(0.346) 
0.176 
(0.501) 
λ-2 −0.962* 
(0.577) 
−0.469** 
(0.183) 
−0.523** 
(0.243) 
−0.249 
(0.307) 
−1.049*** 
(0.371) 
−0.256 
(0.430) 
λ-1 0.163 
(0.345) 
0.084 
(0.272) 
0.027 
(0.339) 
0.223 
(0.391) 
0.290 
(0.375) 
0.377 
(0.362) 
λ0 −0.005 
(0.300) 
−0.425** 
(0.215) 
−0.327 
(0.206) 
−0.156 
(0.236) 
−0.261 
(0.348) 
−0.145 
(0.305) 
λ+1 0.078 
(0.211) 
0.418* 
(0.214) 
0.065 
(0.371) 
0.158 
(0.212) 
0.155 
(0.268) 
−0.526 
(0.362) 
λ+2 0.505 
(0.386) 
0.505 
(0.488) 
0.002 
(0.211) 
0.051 
(0.211) 
0.263 
(0.278) 
0.241 
(0.271) 
λ+3 0.263 
(0.273) 
0.522 
(0.395) 
0.855* 
(0.454) 
0.093 
(0.245) 
0.432 
(0.433) 
0.766 
(0.520) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the 
Consumer Defensive Sector 
Coefficient BGS KO PG THS WBA WMT 
μ0 0.061 
(0.041) 
0.034* 
(0.020) 
0.032 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.042) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
λ-3 −0.576* 
(0.317) 
0.204 
(0.298) 
−0.049 
(0.331) 
−0.069 
(0.411) 
0.117 
(0.270) 
0.345 
(0.312) 
λ-2 0.172 
(0.466) 
−0.341 
(0.278) 
−0.161 
(0.117) 
−0.280 
(0.402) 
0.335 
(0.563) 
−0.507 
(0.385) 
λ-1 0.124 
(0.329) 
−0.209 
(0.215) 
0.069 
(0.260) 
−0.276 
(0.323) 
0.246 
(0.434) 
−0.116 
(0.292) 
λ0 −0.178 
(0.434) 
−0.181 
(0.165) 
0.093 
(0.220) 
−0.383 
(0.379) 
−0.380 
(0.396) 
−0.188 
(0.289) 
λ+1 0.644 
(0.525) 
0.330* 
(0.180) 
0.492* 
(0.299) 
0.593** 
(0.250) 
0.965* 
(0.579) 
0.606* 
(0.321) 
λ+2 0.382 
(0.332) 
0.214 
(0.212) 
0.011 
(0.309) 
0.062 
(0.627) 
0.173 
(0.392) 
0.311 
(0.299) 
λ+3 −0.481 
(0.787) 
0.333 
(0.341) 
0.098 
(0.236) 
−0.281 
(0.483) 
0.724** 
(0.361) 
−0.171 
(0.250) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Energy Sector 
Coefficient APA CVX DVN MRO SLB XOM 
μ0 −0.039 
(0.047) 
0.032 
(0.029) 
−0.041 
(0.049) 
−0.004 
(0.054) 
−0.017 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
λ-3 −0.683 
(0.491) 
0.169 
(0.334) 
0.528 
(0.408) 
0.322 
(0.302) 
0.357 
(0.600) 
−0.036 
(0.303) 
λ-2 −1.076 
(0.726) 
−0.553 
(0.417) 
−0.442 
(1.053) 
−0.472 
(0.971) 
−0.494 
(0.400) 
−0.260 
(0.396) 
λ-1 −0.477* 
(0.284) 
−0.090 
(0.237) 
−0.517 
(0.372) 
0.219 
(0.501) 
0.039 
(0.332) 
−0.052 
(0.252) 
λ0 0.251 
(0.439) 
−0.073 
(0.325) 
0.377 
(0.400) 
0.254 
(0.425) 
−0.230 
(0.467) 
0.048 
(0.257) 
λ+1 0.462 
(0.331) 
0.618*** 
(0.178) 
0.690 
(0.540) 
0.397 
(0.505) 
0.366 
(0.423) 
0.625* 
(0.362) 
λ+2 0.267 
(0.531) 
−0.069 
(0.253) 
0.151 
(0.421) 
−0.026 
(0.437) 
0.380 
(0.652) 
−0.097 
(0.296) 
λ+3 0.841* 
(0.434) 
0.472 
(0.555) 
0.613 
(0.734) 
0.552 
(0.512) 
0.802 
(0.511) 
0.379 
(0.339) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; *** and * mean significant at  
0.01 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Financial Services Sector 
Coefficient AIG AXP GS 
 
JPM TRV V 
μ0 0.020 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.031) 
0.003 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.034) 
0.046* 
(0.024) 
0.082*** 
(0.032) 
λ-3 −0.044 
(0.355) 
0.120 
(0.314) 
0.539 
(0.477) 
0.264 
(0.322) 
0.098 
(0.290) 
0.143 
(0.486) 
λ-2 −0.309 
(0.303) 
−0.301 
(0.337) 
−0.178 
(0.397) 
−0.397 
(0.327) 
−0.184 
(0.313) 
−0.127 
(0.522) 
λ-1 0.173 
(0.501) 
−0.389 
(0.334) 
0.169 
(0.563) 
0.048 
(0.412) 
0.199 
(0.249) 
0.509 
(0.538) 
λ0 −0.046 
(0.483) 
−0.392** 
(0.156) 
−0.656* 
(0.372) 
−0.537 
(0.377) 
−0.190 
(0.281) 
−0.026 
(0.380) 
λ+1 0.489 
(0.434) 
0.417 
(0.291) 
0.469 
(0.432) 
0.091 
(0.538) 
0.606** 
(0.254) 
0.373 
(0.295) 
λ+2 0.352 
(0.392) 
0.193 
(0.277) 
0.023 
(0.377) 
0.253 
(0.432) 
0.019 
(0.218) 
0.359 
(0.349) 
λ+3 0.590* 
(0.338) 
0.506 
(0.357) 
0.763 
(0.500) 
0.622** 
(0.310) 
0.531** 
(0.266) 
0.267 
(0.284) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Healthcare Sector 
Coefficient ABT JNJ LLY MRK PFE UNH 
μ0 0.053** 
(0.025) 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.062** 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.026) 
0.049** 
(0.025) 
0.096*** 
(0.030) 
λ-3 0.477* 
(0.268) 
0.143 
(0.217) 
0.430 
(0.421) 
0.039 
(0.348) 
0.410* 
(0.222) 
0.057 
(0.330) 
λ-2 −0.351 
(0.398) 
−0.247 
(0.284) 
−0.460** 
(0.210) 
−0.423*** 
(0.158) 
−0.693** 
(0.280) 
−0.598 
(0.587) 
λ-1 0.062 
(0.244) 
−0.203 
(0.239) 
0.286 
(0.316) 
0.491* 
(0.277) 
0.268 
(0.394) 
−0.338 
(0.333) 
λ0 −0.024 
(0.231) 
−0.256 
(0.241) 
−0.006 
(0.206) 
−0.116 
(0.128) 
−0.129 
(0.124) 
−0.300** 
(0.127) 
λ+1 0.520** 
(0.207) 
0.252 
(0.286) 
0.503 
(0.358) 
0.380 
(0.340) 
0.107 
(0.253) 
0.448 
(0.418) 
λ+2 0.030 
(0.316) 
0.340 
(0.335) 
−0.164 
(0.269) 
0.132 
(0.258) 
0.113 
(0.324) 
0.300 
(0.518) 
λ+3 0.742 
(0.485) 
0.127 
(0.307) 
0.532 
(0.414) 
0.327 
(0.344) 
0.212 
(0.253) 
0.399 
(0.393) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Industrials Sector 
Coefficient BA CAT CMI MMM NOC UTX 
μ0 0.089*** 
(0.033) 
0.043 
(0.037) 
0.060 
(0.039) 
0.045* 
(0.025) 
0.075*** 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.026) 
λ-3 0.123 
(0.456) 
0.328 
(0.474) 
−0.044 
(0.816) 
−0.217 
(0.360) 
−0.160 
(0.279) 
−0.059 
(0.312) 
λ-2 −0.899** 
(0.385) 
−0.795** 
(0.326) 
−1.489** 
(0.707) 
−0.441** 
(0.213) 
−0.602 
(0.390) 
−0.499* 
(0.280) 
λ-1 0.301 
(0.280) 
0.047 
(0.569) 
0.224 
(0.462) 
0.163 
(0.370) 
0.508 
(0.318) 
0.365 
(0.430) 
λ0 −0.075 
(0.324) 
0.231 
(0.345) 
0.111 
(0.531) 
−0.236 
(0.260) 
−0.278 
(0.350) 
−0.383 
(0.425) 
λ+1 0.387 
(0.441) 
0.266 
(0.292) 
0.347 
(0.317) 
0.503*** 
(0.184) 
0.559** 
(0.282) 
0.415 
(0.369) 
λ+2 0.407 
(0.320) 
−0.126 
(0.416) 
0.126 
(0.411) 
0.276 
(0.339) 
0.279 
(0.339) 
0.143 
(0.252) 
λ+3 0.449** 
(0.210) 
0.961** 
(0.378) 
1.053*** 
(0.332) 
0.609** 
(0.307) 
0.703*** 
(0.187) 
0.322* 
(0.195) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10. Results of the extended Friday the 13th Effect regression for the  
Technology Sector 
Coefficient AAPL ADBE CSCO IBM INTC MSFT 
μ0 0.105*** 
(0.035) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.048 
(0.033) 
0.012 
(0.026) 
0.048 
(0.032) 
0.066** 
(0.031) 
λ-3 −0.410 
(0.473) 
0.295 
(0.478) 
−0.014 
(0.658) 
0.006 
(0.399) 
−0.159 
(0.539) 
−0.263 
(0.499) 
λ-2 −0.983*** 
(0.369) 
0.019 
(0.383) 
−0.441 
(0.449) 
−0.196 
(0.274) 
−0.297 
(0.379) 
−0.423* 
(0.249) 
λ-1 −0.096 
(0.402) 
0.264 
(0.623) 
−0.612 
(0.784) 
−0.018 
(0.323) 
−0.097 
(0.487) 
−0.015 
(0.631) 
λ0 −0.789** 
(0.383) 
0.668 
(0.727) 
−0.847** 
(0.423) 
−0.351* 
(0.183) 
0.268 
(0.552) 
0.235 
(0.504) 
λ+1 0.071 
(0.554) 
−0.498 
(0.709) 
0.551 
(0.596) 
0.471* 
(0.243) 
0.391 
(0.295) 
0.210 
(0.254) 
λ+2 0.687** 
(0.347) 
0.747** 
(0.290) 
0.382 
(0.344) 
0.082 
(0.310) 
0.229 
(0.338) 
0.172 
(0.305) 
λ+3 0.272 
(0.382) 
1.425* 
(0.743) 
0.491 
(0.344) 
0.494 
(0.579) 
0.559 
(0.378) 
0.375 
(0.251) 
Notes: Standard errors are within round brackets; ***, ** and * mean  
significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
